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FRAUD AND DEFALCATION BY A FIDUCIARY: THE 
AMORPHOUS EXCEPTION TO BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE. 
H.C. Jones III 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 523(a)(4) of the United States Bankruptcy Code provides 
that an individual debtor may not receive a bankruptcy discharge for 
any debt “for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, 
embezzlement, or larceny.”1  Over the several iterations of this 
exception,2 courts have struggled to define the terms “defalcation” 
and “fiduciary capacity,” creating much confusion.3  The current 
exception provides that fiduciary capacity is a prerequisite to 
defalcation for discharge purposes.4  However, without a finite 
definition of the former, the latter remains pliable; it is impossible to 
define defalcation without beginning with fiduciary capacity.5  Thus, 
the faulty parameters prescribed to either over time have residually 
affected the other.6   
 
 1. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012). 
2.  Id.; Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978); Act of Mar. 2, 1867, 
ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878); Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 
(repealed 1843). 
 3.  See Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1758–59 (2013) (settling a 
circuit split over the requisite state-of-mind for defalcation); Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 
704, 706 (1878) (discussing whether “fraud” carries a state-of-mind requirement); 
Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 205 (1844) (holding that “fiduciary capacity” exists 
only in the presence of an express trust relationship); Spinoso v. Heilman (In re 
Heilman), 241 B.R. 137, 152 (Bankr. D. Md. 1999) (“It is an understatement to say 
that the courts are divided on the meaning of ‘fiduciary capacity’ for purposes of 
nondischargeability of debts for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary 
capacity . . . .”). 
 4.  § 523(a)(4). 
 5.  “Defalcation is a vague, ill-defined term ripe for creative interpretation with almost no 
currency outside the fiduciary context.”  Zvi S. Rosen, Discharging Fiduciary Debts, 
87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 51, 53 (2013) (quoting Bradley M. Elbein, An Obscure 
Revolution: The Liability of Professionals in Bankruptcy, 48 S.C. L. REV. 743, 756 
(1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  But see Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1758–59 
(requiring recklessness for a finding of defalcation without addressing fiduciary 
capacity). 
 6.  “In veering from the original definition of a ‘fiduciary capacity,’ the lower courts have 
then had to reconstruct the meaning of defalcation in order to avoid having this 
exception swallow the rule of presuming dischargeability.”  Rosen, supra note 5, at 
87. 
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Many federal courts have applied an improper standard and 
permitted various states to deem fiduciary in nature many standard 
commercial relationships.7  This has forced a choice upon subsequent 
courts: allow the proper defalcation standard (strict liability) to touch 
many commercial relationships that are not actually fiduciary; or 
restrict defalcation by imputing to it a novel intent requirement, 
thereby achieving an appropriate narrowness for the exception as a 
whole.8   
In 2013, the Supreme Court addressed the defalcation standard, 
requiring that if a debtor’s conduct is not intentional, it must be 
reckless.9  This is too narrow a requirement for defalcation.  It is true 
that exceptions to discharge effectively strip away from a debtor an 
important mechanism, and should not be applied liberally.10  But this 
does not outweigh the long-standing significance of fiduciary 
capacity for the creditor, and the express intent of the debtor.11  It 
would be absurd to favor all debtors over potentially innocent 
creditors who relied specifically on the trust relationship charged to a 
fiduciary. 
In this Comment, I will argue for a return to the original 
understanding of fiduciary capacity espoused in Chapman v. Forsyth: 
only an express trust agreement can create a fiduciary relationship for 
purposes of a bankruptcy discharge.12  I will argue further that fraud 
and defalcation relate to distinct breakdowns of the fiduciary 
relationship, and should not be interpreted as requiring similar intent.  
Maintaining a rigid definition of fiduciary capacity will ensure the 
relegation of fraud and defalcation to their proper spheres, while best 
serving the “fresh start” policy and presumption of dischargeability 
favored by bankruptcy law. 
 
 7.  See In re Heilman, 241 B.R. at 156 & n.17 (listing cases in which courts deferred to 
state law precedents to decide the ultimate issue of fiduciary capacity). 
 8.  See Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1761 (“[I]t is difficult to find strong policy reasons favoring 
a broader exception here . . . .”). 
 9.  Id. at 1759–60 (“[W]here the conduct at issue does not involve bad faith, moral 
turpitude, or other immoral conduct, the term requires an intentional wrong.  We 
include as intentional . . . reckless conduct . . . .”). 
 10.  See id. at 1760–61. 
 11.  See, e.g., Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 208 (1844). 
 12.  Id. 
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II. EARLY BANKRUPTCY LAW AND THE “FRESH START” 
RATIONALE 
A. The Fresh Start Policy and Exceptions to Discharge 
Bankruptcy is written into the U.S. Constitution,13 but it originally 
was unclear whether Congress had the power to prescribe procedures 
for voluntary bankruptcy petitions.14  By modern standards, providing 
a fresh start to debtors is one of the law’s principle purposes,15 and 
courts tend to presume a discharge is permissible unless there is a 
clear exception stating otherwise.16   
Exceptions to discharge provide that particular debts will survive a 
successful bankruptcy petition, such that the debtor is required to 
repay the creditor despite having received a discharge of all other 
debts.17  These exceptions have morphed over the years, but courts 
continually cite precedent that reflects congressional intent from 
antiquated versions.18  It is important to rein-in the current limits of 
the exceptions to discharge, as their consequences are significant.19  
A firm understanding of the evolution of these exceptions can assist 
in interpreting them correctly. 
B. Versions of the Exceptions to Discharge 
1. Bankruptcy Act of 1841  
The opening section of the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 (1841 Act) 
provided an avenue for debtors to voluntarily file for bankruptcy.20  
This was significant because it represented Congress’s first attempt to 
promulgate the “fresh start” policy to unfortunate debtors.  While 
Congress was given the power “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on 
 
 13.  U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 4. 
 14.  Rosen, supra note 5, at 57 n.29. 
 15.  Charles Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral 
Conversions and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 56–57 
(“[O]ne of the central policies of our bankruptcy law is to give ‘the honest but 
unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, 
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.’”) (quoting 
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)). 
 16.  Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1760 (2013). 
 17.  See generally 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012) (enumerating types of debts from which an 
individual debtor may not be discharged). 
 18. See Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759. 
 19.  See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 58 (1998) (explaining that a broad 
construction would render certain exceptions “superfluous”).  
 20.  Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, 441 (repealed 1843). 
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the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States” by the U.S. 
Constitution, it did so only once prior to the 1841 Act.21  Even then, 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 (1800 Act) merely prescribed creditors’ 
rights for involuntary petitions against a debtor, now signaling that 
the current debtor-favored reading of the defalcation exception is 
quite disparate to Congress’s original intent.22 
The 1841 Act holds nondischargeable any debt “created in 
consequence of a defalcation as a public officer; or as executor, 
administrator, guardian or trustee, or while acting in any other 
fiduciary capacity.”23  These “exceptions to discharge”—analogous to 
the current section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code24—are actually pre-
conditions to any voluntary bankruptcy petition; they are not post 
facto exceptions.25  That is, the exceptions intercede the permissions 
granted by the passage, clearly indicating an intent to protect 
creditors who have relied on debtors to the extent of a fiduciary 
relationship: “All persons whatsoever, . . . owing debts, which shall 
not have been created in consequence of [enumerated fiduciary 
exceptions], . . . shall be deemed bankrupts . . . .”26  Were the 
exceptions “tacked on” to the end, one might argue that they were an 
after-thought—that the primary purpose simply was to establish a 
“way out” for debtors.  That is not the case here. 
Further supporting this notion is the Supreme Court’s 1844 holding 
in Chapman v. Forsyth, interpreting the 1841 Act.27  Today, 
Chapman stands primarily for the proposition that fiduciary capacity 
with regards to bankruptcy dischargeability should be limited to 
express trust relationships, but the Court addressed another important 
issue.28  Interpreting the statute (which had been repealed at that 
point), the Court held, “[t]he debts here specified are excepted from 
the operation of the act.  This exception applies to the debts and not 
to the person, if he owe other debts . . . .  It was proper that Congress 
should not relieve from debts which had been incurred by a violation 
of good faith . . . .”29   
 
 21.  See Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). 
 22.  Id. at 21. 
 23.  5 Stat. at 441. 
 24.  § 523(a)(4). 
 25.  5 Stat. at 441. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202 (1844). 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 207. 
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There is a clear emphasis placed on preventing discharges by 
debtors who have breached a certain level of creditor-confidence.  
This is true even of debtors who are entitled to a discharge of other 
debts in the same bankruptcy proceedings.30 
Perhaps most telling is the 1841 Act’s language itself.  There is a 
semi-colon separating the exception from discharge of a public 
officer who commits defalcation and the exception from discharge of 
any debt incurred through fiduciary capacity.31  Recognizing the 
separation of these exceptions helps us to grasp the original meaning 
and the true weight of the burden imputed to fiduciaries.32   
The first section excepts from the operation of the law all 
debts “created in consequence of a defalcation as a public 
officer,” thus maintaining good faith to the government, or 
as “executor, guardian” etc., thus maintaining good faith to 
the estates entrusted to the petitioner, or “while acting in any 
other fiduciary capacity,” thus maintaining good faith 
generally to the trust reposed.33 
“Contemporary courts did not [ignore the semi-colon].  They 
understood this language as creating two distinct categories of debt—
those that arose from a public officer’s ‘defalcation,’ and those debts 
that arose from a fiduciary capacity.”34  
Because the Court in Chapman espoused the original standard for 
determining fiduciary relationships, its discussion of other terms in 
the now-defunct 1841 Act is particularly relevant.  “The cases 
enumerated [are] ‘the defalcation of a public officer,’ ‘executor,’ 
‘administrator,’ ‘guardian,’ or ‘trustee’ . . . .”35  In the Court’s view, 
defalcation pertained only to the clause relating to public officers.36  
The Court did not quote the Act as “the defalcation of a public 
officer, executor, administrator”—as one would expect if defalcation 
were to apply to each enumerated relationship—rather, it separated 
the word defalcation from each of the others, applying it only to 
public officers.37  Thus, the act of defalcation did not extend to the 
 
 30.  Id. at 209. 
 31.  5 Stat. at 441. 
 32.  See id.  
 33.  Rosen, supra note 5, at 59 n.51 (quoting Flagg v. Ely, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 206, 208 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846)). 
 34. Id. at 59. 
 35.  Chapman, 43 U.S. at 208. 
 36.  See id.   
 37.  See id. 
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other enumerated relationships.38  These other debts were 
nondischargeable because of the level of confidence reposed in the 
trustee by the beneficiary, not because of any particular action by the 
trustee.39 
That is not to say that courts should begin excepting from discharge 
all fiduciary debts; it is merely to highlight the original gravity of 
fiduciary capacity.  The “defalcation exception” has a much different 
form today than in 1841.40  Though the 1841 Act was repealed shortly 
after being enacted, another Bankruptcy Act was passed in 1867, 
carrying on the tradition of the exception.41  Congress amended the 
language, adding further confusion to the meaning of the relevant 
terms.42   
2. Bankruptcy Act of 1867 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 (1867 Act) provided that “no debt 
created by the fraud or embezzlement of the bankrupt, or by his 
defalcation as a public officer, or while acting in any fiduciary 
character, shall be discharged under this act.”43  The shift from the 
1841 Act to the 1867 Act did not represent a sizeable change to the 
exception.  The exceptions for defalcation as a public officer and for 
any debt in a fiduciary capacity remained separate.44 
In the 19th Century, defalcation was understood to include all 
manner of failing to account for funds.45  In this way, it could be 
argued that defalcation did not leave much to be added by the 
following clause, “or while acting in any fiduciary character.”46  
However, the separation of these two clauses most aptly points to 
Congress’s recognition of the express intent accompanying a 
fiduciary relationship.  This was the second exception to discharge 
drafted within 30 years that plainly deemed all fiduciary debts 
nondischargeable.47 
 
 38.  See id. 
 39.  See id. (“The [enumerated relationships] are . . . cases of . . . special trusts . . . .”). 
 40. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012), with Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, 
441 (repealed 1843). 
 41. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, 533 (repealed 1878). 
 42. See supra note 2. 
 43. 14 Stat. at 533. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 46. 14 Stat. at 533. 
 47. Id. 
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It is worth noting that Congress inserted “fraud or embezzlement” 
into the enumerated exceptions in the 1867 Act, though clearly not 
within the purview of the “fiduciary character” provision.48  This may 
have been a precursor to the forcible insertion of the “action-
exceptions” (fraud and defalcation) under the umbrella of fiduciary 
capacity, brought to fruition by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.49 
3. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 
 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (1898 Act) was the point of no return.  
The 1898 Act provided that “[a] discharge in bankruptcy shall release 
a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as . . . were 
created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation 
while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity.”50  This was 
the first time specific actions had been included within the fiduciary 
capacity exception,51 and the current Bankruptcy Code mirrors this 
construction.52 
Congress included several provisions now present in section 523 of 
the U.S Bankruptcy Code, Exceptions to Discharge, having nothing 
to do with fiduciary obligations.53  The inclusion of additional 
exceptions forced courts to begin narrowing the various provisions’ 
meanings, so as not to except all debts from discharge.54  This 
tightening resulted mostly from courts applying precedent concerning 
repealed versions of the exception to current versions.55 
Twenty years before the enactment of the 1898 Act, in Neal v. 
Clark, the Supreme Court determined that fraud for dischargeability 
purposes required “actual fraud.”56  The Court reasoned that “a 
passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes 
and follows it.”57  Because “fraud” was enumerated alongside 
“embezzlement” at the time, fraud must have required intentional 
 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  See infra Part II.B.3. 
 50.  Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 550–51 (repealed 1978). 
 51.  See id.; 14 Stat. at 533; Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, 441 (repealed 1843). 
 52.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012). 
 53.  See generally id. § 523 (excepting from discharge debts incurred by tax, non-fiduciary 
frauds and false-pretenses, willful and malicious injury to a creditor’s property, etc.). 
 54.  See supra Part II.A (explaining that bankruptcy laws and courts interpreting them 
attempt to maintain the presumption of discharge, and support the “fresh start” 
policy). 
 55.  See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  
 56.  95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877) (“[F]raud referred to in that section means positive fraud, or 
fraud in fact, . . . as does embezzlement.”). 
 57.  Id. at 708. 
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wrongdoing or moral turpitude, like embezzlement.58  Courts still cite 
this analysis today.59 
However, the Court in Neal was analyzing the 1867 Act, which 
contained fraud and embezzlement as exceptions to discharge 
irrespective of the relationship between the creditor and debtor—
there was no fiduciary requirement.60  Of course, the fiduciary 
relationship was no less important in 1898 than it was in 1841; the 
Supreme Court cited Chapman’s 1844 express trust language long 
after the passage of the 1898 Act.61  Thus, fraud may have required 
“moral turpitude or intentional wrongdoing” after 1900, but not 
because of the Court’s 1878 interpretation of a different version of 
the Act.62  When Congress moved fraud to the fiduciary capacity 
exception, a new analysis of its requirements was warranted, but not 
undertaken; even the Supreme Court still refers to Neal.63 
The 1898 exception represents an attempt to enumerate the various 
ways a fiduciary debtor may incur a debt to a creditor, and to prevent 
those debts from being discharged in most circumstances.64  The 
reality of the exception probably was that “embezzlement” and 
“misappropriation” were superfluous terms for fiduciary capacity, 
which is why they were excluded from later versions of the 
exception.65  Fraud and defalcation, however, are distinct actions by a 
fiduciary, so they remain in the modern exception.66 
4. The Bankruptcy Code 
The 1898 Act was repealed in 1978 with the advent of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code.67  While section 523 largely was based upon the 
exceptions listed in the 1898 Act, it also expanded them.68  Section 
523(a)(4), which is still in effect today, declared nondischargeable 
any debt resulting from “fraud or defalcation while acting in a 
 
 58.  Id. at 709. 
 59.  Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (2013). 
 60.  Neal, 95 U.S. at 707; see supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 61.  Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934) (citing Chapman as fixing 
the rigid structure of fiduciary capacity). 
 62.  Neal, 95 U.S. at 709. 
 63.  See Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759. 
 64.  See Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 550–51 (repealed 1978).  
 65.  “Embezzlement” and “misappropriation” are not within the fiduciary capacity 
exception of the current U.S. Bankruptcy Code.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012). 
 66.  Id. 
 67. 30 Stat. at 544. 
 68.  § 523(a)(4). 
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fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny.”69  Clearly, 
“embezzlement” and “larceny” are outside of the fiduciary capacity 
exception, leaving “fraud” and “defalcation” as the only actions that 
can except a fiduciary’s debt from discharge.70   
Because fiduciary capacity is a prerequisite for the relevant fraud 
and defalcation, the definitions of these terms are co-dependent.  
Most directly, courts cannot ascribe “fraud” and “defalcation” their 
proper definitions without harnessing the original spirit of “fiduciary 
capacity,” as was established in Chapman v. Forsyth in 1844.71   
III. FIDUCIARY CAPACITY 
A. Chapman v. Forsyth 
In Chapman v. Forsyth, the Court provided the groundwork for 
understanding fiduciary capacity for purposes of a bankruptcy 
discharge.72  The defendant (Forsyth) was a “factor,” working on 
behalf of the plaintiff (Chapman).73  Factors were similar to modern-
day consignment shops, selling goods on behalf of others with the 
express intention of returning the profits, less a commission.74  
Chapman had engaged Forsyth to sell 150 bales of cotton, but was 
never given the profits of the sale.75  After Forsyth declared 
bankruptcy under the 1841 Act, Chapman challenged the discharge, 
claiming that Forsyth had incurred his debt while acting in a fiduciary 
capacity.76 
The Court held that a factor was not a fiduciary for purposes of a 
bankruptcy discharge:   
If the [bankruptcy act] embrace such a debt, it will be 
difficult to limit its application.  It must include all debts 
arising from agencies; and indeed all cases where the law 
implies an obligation from the trust reposed in the debtor.  
Such a construction would have left but few debts on which 
the law could operate.  In almost all the commercial 
transactions of the country, confidence is reposed in the 
 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 208 (1844).  
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 206. 
 74.  Id. at 206–07. 
 75.  Id. at 206. 
 76.  Id. 
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punctuality and integrity of the debtor, and a violation of 
these is, in a commercial sense, a disregard of a trust.  But 
this is not the relation spoken of in the first section of the act 
. . . . The cases enumerated . . . are not cases of implied but 
special trusts, and the “other fiduciary capacity” mentioned 
must mean the same class of trusts.  The act speaks of 
technical trusts, and not those which the law implies from 
the contract.77 
In 1934, the Court claimed that this standard “has been applied . . . 
in varied situations with unbroken continuity” ever since.78  
Additionally, courts of appeal often rely on Chapman, as quoted and 
augmented by its progeny.79  Yet, many courts have strayed from 
Chapman, allowing state law to determine the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship irrespective of an express trust analysis.80 
B. The (De-)Evolution of the Fiduciary Relationship 
If fiduciary capacity is not narrowly drawn, courts run the risk of 
“making the exception so broad that it reaches such ordinary 
commercial relationships as creditor-debtor and principal-agent.”81  
Many courts “have in effect ignored the Supreme Court’s teaching 
regarding technical and express trusts . . . [and] simply look to state 
law to see if some fiduciary obligation in a general sense has been 
created.”82  “The problem with deferring to State law the decision of 
what constitutes fiduciary capacity is that State law considers 
 
 77.  Id. at 208. 
 78.  Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934) (citing Neal v. Clark, 95 
U.S. 704, 708 (1877)); Tindle v. Birkett, 205 U.S. 183, 184–86 (1907); Crawford v. 
Burke, 195 U.S. 176, 193 (1904); Upshur v. Briscoe, 138 U.S. 365, 375–376 (1891); 
Noble v. Hammond, 129 U.S. 65, 68 (1889); Hennequin v. Clews, 111 U.S. 676, 682 
(1884). 
 79.  Arvest Mortg. Co. v. Nail (In re Nail), 680 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing 
Aetna, 293 U.S. at 333 (quoting Chapman, 43 U.S. at 208)); Follett Higher Educ. 
Grp., Inc. v. Berman (In re Berman), 629 F.3d 761, 768 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Chapman, 43 U.S. at 207). 
 80.  See Spinoso v. Heilman (In re Heilman), 241 B.R. 137, 156 & n.17 (Bankr. D. Md. 
1999) (listing cases in which the court deferred to state law precedents to decide the 
ultimate issue of fiduciary capacity). 
 81.  Id. at 159 (quoting Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Miles (In re Miles), 5 B.R. 458, 
460 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980)). 
 82.  Bamco 18 v. Reeves (In re Reeves), 124 B.R. 5, 10 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990) (citing a 
litany of cases in which the court permitted state law fiduciary classifications to carry 
its decision). 
2015 Fraud and Defalcation by a Fiduciary 143 
 
practically every agent to be a fiduciary within the scope of his or her 
employment.”83   
To effectuate the proper standard, courts must determine whether a 
trustee willingly accepted the responsibilities associated with an 
express trust: “The characteristics of an express trust include an 
explicit declaration of the creation of a trust, a clearly defined trust 
res, and an intent to create a trust relationship.”84  This has been 
widely misapplied. 
In In re Heilman, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Maryland cataloged instances where courts had strayed from the 
appropriate standard: “Opinions are split as to attorneys, corporate 
directors, officers and shareholders, general partners, limited 
partners, and joint venturers, property managers, insurance agents, 
lottery agents, and contractors, subcontractors and homebuilders.”85  
In those cases, a significant number of courts allowed state law to 
take precedence.86  The court explained that “while state law is 
important in determining when a trust relationship exists, the issue of 
whether the debtor was acting in a fiduciary capacity is ultimately a 
federal question.”87   
There are examples in almost every circuit of bankruptcy courts 
and appellate courts failing to adhere to this standard, creating an 
amalgam of case law defining fiduciary capacity.88  The result is that 
whether a fiduciary can receive a discharge depends largely on the 
 
 83.  In re Heilman, 24 B.R. at 157 & n.18 (cataloging cases). 
 84.  In re Reeves, 124 B.R. at 9 (quoting R.I. Lottery Comm’n v. Cairone (In re Cairone), 
12 B.R. 60, 62 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1981)). 
 85.  In re Heilman, 241 B.R. at 152–55 & nn. 9–15 (footnotes omitted) (citing cases with 
differing opinions on fiduciary capacity in each of the listed professions). 
 86.  Id. at 156.  
 87.  Id. at 158 (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Stahl v. Lang (In re Lang), 108 B.R. 
586, 589 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989)). 
 88. See id. at 156 n.17.  The court listed cases from across the country where judges 
merely applied a state law standard: 
 Schriebman v. Zanetti-Gierke (In re Zanetti-Gierke), 212 B.R. 375 (Bankr. D. Kan. 
1997) (a partner is not a fiduciary under Kansas and Missouri law for purposes of § 
523(a)(4)); Smith v. Young (In re Young), 208 B.R. 189 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1997) 
(fiduciary capacity is a question of Federal law, but State law is considered for 
purpose of determining the existence of a trust); Krishnamurthy v. Nimmagadda (In re 
Krishnamurthy), 209 B.R. 714 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997) (whether a relationship is a 
fiduciary one within the meaning of § 523(a)(4) is a question of Federal law that can 
be resolved by looking to State law; under California law, a partner is a fiduciary).  
 Id.  
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jurisdiction hearing the bankruptcy petition.89  This is unacceptable, 
as “it is important to have a uniform interpretation of federal law.”90 
C. The Appropriate Standard 
The original Chapman v. Forsyth standard is the appropriate one 
for determining fiduciary capacity.91  “Express trusts are those which 
are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some 
writing, or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly 
evincing an intention to create a trust.”92  There must be “the 
separation of the legal and beneficial interests in a . . . ‘res,’ . . . 
whereby the legal interests are held by . . . the trustee, for the benefit 
of another, the beneficiary.93  It is only under these conditions, and 
not when a trust arises after the fact, that a fiduciary relationship 
exists.94   
That is,  
[i]t is not enough that by the very act of wrongdoing out of 
which the contested debt arose, the bankrupt has become 
chargeable as a trustee ex maleficio.  He must have been a 
trustee before the wrong and without reference thereto . . . . 
“The language would seem to apply only to a debt created 
by a person who was already a fiduciary when the debt was 
created.”95 
The proper definition of fiduciary capacity has a heightened duty of 
care for the beneficiary built in, and a party cannot become a trustee 
 
 89.  See supra note 88; see also Rosen, supra note 5, at 73–77.  
 90.  Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1761 (2013). 
 91.  See Rosen, supra note 5, at 52 (“[C]ourts should follow the approach of the Ninth, 
Eighth and Fourth Circuits that looks to the origins of these terms, when . . . ‘fiduciary 
capacity’ required the existence of an express or technical trust.”). 
 92.  In re Heilman, 241 B.R. at 161 (quoting Wertin v. Wertin, 13 N.W.2d 749, 751 
(Minn. 1944)). 
 93.  See id. (quoting 17 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 20 (1992)). 
 94.  Id. at 161–62 (“Only the parties themselves can create a fiduciary relationship in fact.  
A statute may recognize that relationship and impose additional burdens upon it, 
including criminal liability for its abuse.  A statute may even purport to convert a 
breach of contract into a breach of a trust ex maleficio, but these are in the nature of 
constructive or resulting trusts, arising by operation of law, and therefore 
distinguishable from express or technical trusts for purposes of nondischargeability of 
debt in bankruptcy.”). 
 95.  Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934) (quoting Upshur v. Bricoe, 
138 U.S. 365, 378 (1891)). 
2015 Fraud and Defalcation by a Fiduciary 145 
 
merely by way of breaching a pre-existing duty to a creditor.96  Such 
debts would have not arisen from an express trust.97   
It is with this proper understanding in mind that the offenses 
specific to fiduciary capacity should be considered.  A creditor must 
show that “(1) an express trust existed, (2) the debt was caused by 
fraud or defalcation, and (3) the debtor acted as a fiduciary at the time 
the debt was created.”98  Adhering to this strict construction, there is 
no need to restrict the defalcation exception, particularly considering 
that fraud already carries a state-of-mind requirement.99 
IV. FRAUD AND DEFALCATION 
A. Precedent 
1. Fraud 
It has been settled since 1877 that fraud under the Bankruptcy laws 
requires actual fraud, not constructive fraud.100  Nevertheless, it is 
important to critique how the rationale for the current fraud standard 
has survived so uniformly over the years; the standard from Neal has 
been applied for 137 years despite multiple changes to the 
exception.101 
Actual fraud means “positive fraud, or fraud in fact, involving 
moral turpitude or intentional wrong.”102  The Court’s rationale for 
this requirement was the placement of fraud alongside embezzlement 
in the 1867 Act.103  Of course, the fraud included in the 1867 Act is 
more analogous to the current section 523(a)(2)(A), not the fraud 
within the defalcation exception.104  That is, in interpreting fraud to 
mean actual fraud, the Court was construing a portion of the 
 
 96.  In re Heilman, 241 B.R. at 161–162. 
 97. See Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. 202, 208 (1844). 
 98.  Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Who Is Acting in “Fiduciary Capacity” Within Meaning 
of Fraud or Defalcation Discharge Exception in Bankruptcy (11 U.S.C.A. § 
523(a)(4))—Fiduciary Capacity of Debtors Other Than Sales, Purchasing, or Leasing 
Agent Debtors, 17 A.L.R. FED. 2d 33 (2015) (emphasis added). 
 99. Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1761 (2013). 
 100.  Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877). 
 101.  See Sachan v. Huh (In re Huh), 506 B.R. 257, 264 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014) (stating that, 
despite policy shifts in the current Bankruptcy Code, Neal has not been overruled and 
“constitute[s] part of the background to the adoption” of aspects of the Code). 
 102.  Neal, 95 U.S. at 709. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012); see also supra Part II.B.3. 
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provision not within the fiduciary capacity exception, but a stand-
alone fraud provision.105 
After the 1898 Act included fraud under the fiduciary capacity 
exception, the logic supporting the imputation of a heightened state-
of-mind merely remained unchallenged.106  The exhaustive list of 
actions triggering an exception from discharge under fiduciary 
capacity became fraud and defalcation, with fraud containing an 
intent requirement from its prior interpretation.107  With this 
construction, it was only a matter of time before the Court would use 
some version of a noscitur a sociis (known from its associates) 
analysis to conclude that defalcation also would require some form of 
intent.108  
2. Defalcation 
The exact definition of defalcation is unclear, but the Supreme 
Court addressed recently its state-of-mind requirement.109  Professor 
Zvi Rosen provides a thorough explanation of the origins of the term 
defalcation in his article, supra, arguing for a strict liability 
requirement, as appears to have been the early understanding.110   
In 1937, Judge Learned Hand wrote in Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Herbst, while sitting on the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, “[c]olloquially perhaps the word, ‘defalcation,’ 
ordinarily implies some moral dereliction, but in [the 1841 Act] it 
may have included innocent defaults, so as to include all fiduciaries 
who for any reason were short in their accounts.”111 
There, the bankrupt (the defendant for purposes of the defalcation 
suit) had been appointed receiver of a parcel of land as the result of a 
foreclosure in the Supreme Court of New York.112  He received 
monetary allowances totaling nearly $50,000, which he withdrew and 
spent.113  The trouble was that the defendant did not wait for the 
 
 105.  Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878). 
 106.  Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 550–51 (repealed 1978). 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (2013). 
 109.  Id. (“Thus, where the conduct does not involve bad faith, moral turpitude, or other 
immoral conduct, the term requires an intentional wrong.”) (emphasis added). 
 110.  See Rosen, supra note 5, at 53 (“By the beginning of the 19th century, defalcation was 
used more commonly to refer to an impermissible ‘holding back’ of funds.  In this 
context, it covered both an intentional failure to remit funds, . . . and a mere negligent 
failure or inability to account for funds.”). 
 111.  93 F.2d 510, 511 (2d Cir. 1937). 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
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plaintiff’s appeal window to close, and did not consult with the 
plaintiff regarding whether it planned to appeal.114  The plaintiff did 
appeal, and the defendant was ordered to remit a portion of the funds, 
but was unable to pay the balance.115 
The Court of Appeals of New York decided that the defendant’s 
surety was responsible to pay the remainder, so the surety filed suit 
against the defendant in his voluntary bankruptcy petition, seeking to 
have his debt to the surety excepted from discharge.116  The surety 
alleged that the defendant had incurred the debt by “fraud, 
embezzlement misappropriation [sic], or defalcation while acting as 
an officer or in [a] fiduciary capacity.”117 
The court assumed arguendo that the defendant’s conduct did not 
constitute fraud, embezzlement, or misappropriation, because it found 
affirmatively that the conduct was, in fact, defalcation.118  En route to 
this finding, Judge Hand explained that “[w]hatever was the original 
meaning of ‘defalcation,’ it must here have covered other defaults 
than deliberate malversations, else it added nothing to the words, 
‘fraud or embezzlement.’”119 
Despite acknowledging that defalcation must include 
“malversations” with no heightened state of mind, Judge Hand 
ultimately did provide a lengthy description of what knowledge could 
be imputed to the defendant: 
In the case at bar the bankrupt had not been entirely 
innocent—not, for instance like the victim of an 
employee—though possibly one may acquit him of 
deliberate wrongdoing.  A judge had awarded him the 
money, and prima facie he was entitled to it; but he knew, or 
if he did not know, he was charged with notice (having held 
himself out as competent to be an officer of the court), that 
the order would not protect him if it were reversed; and that 
it might be reversed until the time to appeal had expired.  He 
made no effort to learn from the plaintiff whether it meant to 
 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id.; see also Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Williams, 280 N.Y.S. 314, 315 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1935).  
 116.  Herbst, 93 F.2d at 511; see also Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat’l Surety 
Corp., 10 N.W.2d 560, 560–61 (N.Y. 1937). 
 117.  Herbst, 93 F.2d at 511. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id.  Puzzlingly, the Supreme Court, in Bullock cited the following dicta from Judge 
Hand’s opinion, while leaving out the above text: defalcation “may have included 
innocent defaults.”  133 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (2013).  
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appeal, and he did not wait until it could no longer do so; he 
took his chances.120 
It is worth noting here that the court appears to be “hedging its 
bets” by analyzing the defendant’s state of mind.121 That is, Judge 
Hand understood that a finding of defalcation was unimpeachable if 
the state-of-mind were present; whereas a finding of defalcation for 
an accidental default may have been criticized.122   
This holding is mistaken as requiring a positive intent of 
defalcation.123  This standard was applied simply because of the 
confusing and redundant enumerated offenses, which, in any event, 
are much different in the current version of the exception.124   
For confirmation, one need look no further than the court’s 
disclaimer at the end of the opinion: “All we decide is that when a 
fiduciary takes money upon a conditional authority which may be 
revoked and knows at the time that it may, he is guilty of a 
‘defalcation’ though it may not be a ‘fraud,’ or an ‘embezzlement,’ or 
perhaps not even a ‘misappropriation.’”125  Judge Hand’s opinion 
ultimately would be used as support for a state-of-mind 
requirement.126 
B. Intent Requirement 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s (faulty) settling in Bullock of the 
debate over an intent requirement, the circuit courts were split into 
three groups: 
The First and Second Circuits require[d] “a showing of 
conscious misbehavior or extreme recklessness—a showing 
akin to the showing required for scienter in the securities 
law context.”  The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh 
Circuits require[d] a general “showing of recklessness by 
the fiduciary” beyond mere negligence.  By way of contrast, 
the Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits utilize[d] a standard 
closer to the traditional meaning of defalcation—not 
 
 120.  Herbst, 93 F.2d at 512.   
 121.  See id.   
 122.  “[D]efalcation may demand some portion of misconduct; we will assume arguendo 
that it does.”  Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 123.  Id.   
 124.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012). 
 125.  Herbst, 93 F.2d at 512. 
 126.  Id.  
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imposing any intent requirement, but rather focusing on the 
“actus reus,” or the type of action or inaction that constitutes 
a defalcation.127 
The appropriate standard is that previously followed by the Fourth, 
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.  “[T]he ‘essence of defalcation in the 
context of § 523(a)(4) is a failure to produce funds entrusted to a 
fiduciary.’”128  Defalcation should be limited to a failure to account 
for the trust res,129 and would therefore not require intent to achieve 
the proper level of narrowness.  “[F]or purposes of [§ 523(a)(4)], an 
act need not ‘rise to the level of . . . embezzlement or even 
misappropriation.’”130  “[N]egligence or even an innocent mistake 
which results in misappropriation or failure to account is 
sufficient.”131  This is not a harsh penalty; it is a recognition of the 
responsibilities ascribed to a fiduciary if analyzed under the proper 
construction.132 
 The new standard set by the Supreme Court in Bullock 
undoubtedly will restrict the exception to a degree rendering it moot.  
If applying the appropriate fiduciary capacity standard, as well as the 
new defalcation standard, only near criminally-reckless activities will 
suffice.  There is a heightened duty of care already imputed to a 
fiduciary.133  Requiring a heightened state of mind for defalcation 
disregards the careful attention accorded to fiduciary duties. 
V. BULLOCK V. BANKCHAMPAIGN 
In Bullock, the Supreme Court held that, for defalcation, conduct 
lacking bad faith, moral turpitude, or other immoral conduct, requires 
an intentional wrong.134  In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied 
 
 127.  Rosen, supra note 5, at 77–78 (footnotes omitted). 
 128. Id. at 78 (quoting Blyler v. Hemmeter (In re Hemmeter), 242 F.3d 1186, 1191 (9th 
Cir. 2001)). 
 129. Id. at 82. 
 130.  Republic of Rwanda v. Uwimana (In re Uwimana), 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(quoting Pahlavi v. Ansari (In re Ansari), 113 F.3d 17, 20 (4th Cir. 1997)). 
 131. Id. 
 132.  See supra Part III.B. 
 133.  See supra Part III.B.  This would require that a debtor had entered into an express 
trust relationship for the benefit of the creditor, knowing precisely the responsibilities 
of the relationship, and then acted with the recklessness prescribed by the model penal 
code in failing to remit the funds in his charge. 
 134.  Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (2013) (“[W]e include 
reckless conduct of the kind set forth in the Model Penal Code.  Where actual 
knowledge of wrongdoing is lacking, we consider conduct as equivalent if the 
 
150 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 45 
 
on five considerations: (1) statutory context; (2) that the chosen 
definition defines defalcation differently from its linguistic neighbors 
in the statute; (3) concurrence with the principle that “exceptions to 
discharge should be confined to those plainly expressed”; (4) that 
some circuits have applied a similar interpretation without 
administrative or practical difficulties; and (5) the importance of 
uniform interpretation of federal law.135 
(1) Statutory context.  The Court determined that the statutory 
context strongly favors an interpretation of defalcation that requires 
an intentional wrong.136  In reaching this decision, the Court 
referenced Justice Harlan’s opinion in Neal.137  Accordingly, it held 
that defalcation should be interpreted keeping in mind that the 
exception includes fraud, embezzlement, and larceny—a point the 
Court considered strong support for reading into defalcation a state-
of-mind requirement.138  However, Justice Harlan was interpreting a 
version of the discharge provision that excluded fraud from the 
fiduciary capacity exception.139  In fact, the version in question, the 
1867 Act, required on its face that all fiduciary debts were 
nondischargeable.140 
Regardless, the Court relied on the interpretation of a different 
fraud provision from the one situated beside the word it was 
attempting to define (defalcation), and found support in that provision 
for a heightened intent requirement.141  Ironically, had this case been 
litigated in 1878, defining defalcation would have been a moot point 
because all fiduciary debts were nondischargeable by the plain 
language of the 1867 Act.142   
Similarly, it is difficult to understand why the intent requirements 
of “embezzlement” and “larceny” should play a role in the 
construction of defalcation, when both terms clearly are situated 
outside of the purview of the fiduciary capacity exception.143  
Embezzlement and larceny are sufficient alone to except from 
 
fiduciary ‘consciously disregards’ (or is willfully blind to) ‘a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk’ that his conduct will turn out to violate a fiduciary duty.”). 
 135.  Id. at 1759–61. 
 136.  Id. at 1760. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 706 (1877). 
 140.  Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, 533 (repealed 1878). 
 141.  Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759–60. 
 142.  14 Stat. at 533. 
 143.  See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012). 
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discharge a debt; there is no express trust relationship required.144  It 
follows then that whatever the state of mind required for those 
actions—not presupposing a heightened duty of care—it should have 
no bearing on the state of mind required for defalcation.  
Nonetheless, this was the Supreme Court’s lead argument for a 
heightened intent requirement for a finding of defalcation.145 
(2) The definition of defalcation is contrastable with that of fraud, 
embezzlement, and larceny.146  That is, defalcation with a heightened 
intent requirement is not identical to the other enumerated actions, 
and each of those actions are not merely “special cases of 
defalcation.”147  This explanation offers nothing over a strict-liability 
interpretation.  Embezzlement and larceny do not require a fiduciary 
relationship,148 and fraud still can overlap with defalcation within the 
Court’s interpretation;149 it is a distinction without a difference. 
Further, the Court acknowledges that “[t]he statutory provision 
makes clear that . . . [embezzlement and larceny] apply outside of the 
fiduciary context.”150  It is not clear the virtue of providing distinct 
definitions between non-fiduciary action-exceptions (embezzlement 
and larceny) and fiduciary action-exceptions (fraud and defalcation).  
Presumably, the distinction arises out of favoring non-superfluous 
statutes.151 
This logic is not ubiquitous, however: section 523(a)(2)(A) 
contains actual fraud as an enumerated exception,152 yet actual fraud 
is exactly what is required by section 523(a)(4), per the Court’s 
analysis.153  It appears that in certain instances, exceptions 
specifically within the fiduciary context are sufficiently 
 
 144.  See id. 
 145. Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759–60. 
 146. Id. at 1760. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  See § 523(a)(4). 
 149.  Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1760 (“‘[D]efalcation,’ unlike ‘fraud,’ may be used to refer to 
nonfraudulent breaches of fiduciary duty.”) (citing Defalcation, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)).  This is true, but it does not change the fact that 
defalcation may be used to refer to fraudulent breaches of fiduciary duty as well; there 
still is no steadfast definition of the term.  Using this construction, defalcation can 
encompass fraud and the blank space left over. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  See id. (quoting Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 
687, 698 (1995)).  
 152.  § 523(a)(2)(A). 
 153.  Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877). 
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distinguishable, so as not to require the Court to “treat statutory terms 
as surplusage.”154 
(3) Exceptions to discharge ought to be confined to those plainly 
expressed in the statute.  The Court explains that this consideration 
would benefit nonprofessional trustees,155 meaning that debtors 
without a full understanding of the responsibilities inherent in the 
relationship are spared from the perpetual insolvency that would 
accompany a nondischargeable debt.  Of course, applying the 
appropriate fiduciary capacity standard would eliminate many of 
these innocent nonprofessional debtors in the first place.156 
Here, the Court has touched upon the very crux of the issue: the 
new defalcation standard is a result of a pervasive misunderstanding 
of the proper fiduciary capacity standard.  If courts more consistently 
applied the original standard—requiring an express trust—the harm 
to nonprofessional trustees would be minimal, or at least limited to 
those who knowingly accepted the responsibility.157  It would be 
perverse to protect some small number of nonprofessional trustees 
who ill-advisedly entered into a fiduciary relationship rather than 
hold accountable potentially many more savvy, but negligent, 
debtors. 
(4) Some circuits have applied a similar interpretation without 
statutory or administrative difficulties.158  There is no evidence to 
doubt the veracity of this contention, but the point is invalid.  There is 
evidence supporting the efficacy of applying either of the other 
standards previously used by the courts of appeal as well.159 
(5) Interpreting federal statutes uniformly is important.  The irony 
of this contention is that the very reason for the narrowing of the 
defalcation exception is the uneven application of the fiduciary 
capacity standard.160  The Court reasoned that Congress intended for 
each of the action-exceptions (embezzlement, larceny, fraud, and 
defalcation) to be read in similar ways, but this disregards the 
fiduciary relationship.161 
It makes no sense to require a similar intent of the provisions 
within the fiduciary capacity exception and those outside of it.  The 
 
 154.  Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1760 (quoting Babbit, 515 U.S. at 698). 
 155.  Id. at 1761. 
 156. See supra Part III.C. 
 157.  See supra Part III.C. 
 158.  Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1761.   
 159.  Rosen, supra note 5, at 77–78. 
 160.  See supra Part III.B. 
 161.  Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1760. 
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former can be committed only by a person who has willingly entered 
into an express trust relationship; the latter can be committed by 
anyone, regardless of their relationship to the creditor.162 
VI. DELINEATING THE EXCEPTIONS 
Fraud and defalcation, whatever their definitions, are at issue only 
with regard to fiduciaries.163  In this context, fraud requires 
intentional misrepresentation, and defalcation now requires 
recklessness.164  Intentional misrepresentation is an appropriate 
requirement for a finding of fraud, but not because of precedent from 
1878.165  Rather, fraud ought to require an intentional 
misrepresentation because the act itself may occur without any true 
damage to the creditor.  That is, a trustee may fraudulently incur a 
debt to his beneficiary, not by any loss sustained by the beneficiary, 
but because of an undue pecuniary gain to the trustee.166  To require 
such a debt to survive a successful bankruptcy petition would be 
extraordinary, considering that the creditor would have suffered no 
actual loss.  Thus, debts incurred by fraud should be excepted from 
discharge only if the debtor had an intent to defraud the creditor. 
On the other hand, a trustee who incurs a debt by defalcation 
necessarily will have affected a loss to the beneficiary.167  
Dictionaries have carried similar definitions of defalcation since 
1867, and the crux is that the trustee defaulted on his debt to the 
beneficiary, meaning the beneficiary incurred a real loss of the trust 
res.168  Such a debt should not be discharged, as the entire point for 
 
 162.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012). 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1760. 
 165.  Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877). 
 166.  Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1759 (assuming that defalcation was broad enough to cover a 
fiduciary’s failure to make a trust more than whole).  If the Court assumes arguendo 
that defalcation was this broad, the same must apply with equal force to fraud.  In fact, 
it is more likely that a debt by fraud would create a situation where the trustee is 
required to remit funds to the beneficiary of greater than the original amount of the 
trust.  
 167.  See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text. 
 168.  See Bullock, 133 S. Ct. at 1758 (“[A] law dictionary in use in 1867 defines the word 
‘defalcation’ as ‘the act of a defaulter,’ which, in turn, it defines broadly as one ‘who 
is deficient in his accounts, or fails in making his accounts correct.’”) (citations 
omitted); id. (providing a definition from BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY: “a non 
fraudulent default.”) (citations omitted); see also supra note 118 and accompanying 
text. 
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the creditor of a fiduciary relationship is the faithful execution of the 
trustee’s duties.169 
A proper definition of “fiduciary capacity” requires that the trustee 
knows the responsibilities of being a fiduciary at the outset of the 
relationship, so there is no undue burden on fiduciary debtors.170  The 
fraudulent acquisition of an undue benefit should require intentional 
wrongdoing to be excepted from discharge; but withholding from the 
beneficiary the very res that was the point of the transaction should 
carry strict liability. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
A return to the original definition of fiduciary, as espoused in 
Chapman v. Forsyth, can forestall any future expansion of the 
exceptions to discharge by rendering unnecessary the constant 
redefining of terms to prevent the steady undoing of its purpose.171 
With proper definitions of fiduciary capacity, fraud, and 
defalcation, and a proper understanding of why those terms are 
placed alongside (though clearly separated from) embezzlement and 
larceny, courts could begin to apply a uniform standard for 





 169. See supra Part III.B. 
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